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Abstract
We apply a network approach to analyze individual and aggregate con-
sumption that generates predominately local pollution (e.g., noise, water
and air quality, waste disposal sites). This allows us to relate the indi-
vidual pollution levels to network centralities and to determine the effects
of transfers among agents on the aggregate contamination. We then ap-
ply our theoretical framework to analyze the European data on fossil fuel
energy consumption and discuss the impact of EU redistributive transfer
policies on the aggregate level of pollution.
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The unprecedented economic growth experienced around the world over the past
decades has been accompanied by an unceasing depletion of natural resources.
At the same time, the increasing levels of global (e.g., greenhouse gas warming,
mercury contamination, stratospheric ozone depletion) and local (e.g., water and
air quality, noise, waste disposal sites) pollution have significantly endangered
the services provided by natural assets. Transboundary air pollution has been a
concern since the early twentieth century,1 and the analysis of the international
dimension of greenhouse gas emission control has been an object of research
since the seminal paper of Carraro and Siniscalco (1992). However, there have
been so far few international attempts to coordinate efforts to reduce global
emissions of greenhouse gases. For example, the celebrated Kyoto protocol,
signed in 1997 by more than 180 countries, was the most prominent international
treaty aiming at the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions but it had limited
success.2 A more recent attempt to advance the reduction of emissions is the
Paris Agreement, which was signed by nearly 200 countries in December 2015.
Motivated by these international concerns, in the recent years scholars have
devoted increasing efforts to the study of the abatement of (global) emissions,
through the analysis of, e.g., the incentives to invest in green technologies and
the design of optimal contracts that may facilitate international coordination
on environmental issues (e.g., Harstad, 2012, 2016; Batten et al., 2018; and
references therein).
Unlike most of the existing literature, this work focuses on local pollution.
Local pollution affects only neighbors of a polluting site and creates different
incentives than global contamination. Moreover, it lends itself to a network
approach that helps us understand not only the incentives but also to design
appropriate policy measures. This paper aims to be a first step in this direction.
Specifically, we propose a model in which different agents (countries, regions,
1 See, for instance, Wirth (1996), on the Trail smelter dispute between Candadians and
Americans from 1927 to 1941. The Trail settlement is the first international ruling on trans-
boundary air pollution.
2 As pointed out in Aldy and Stavins (2009, Ch. 1) the main reasons of these insufficient
achievements were that some of the world’s leading greenhouse gas emitters were not con-
strained by the Kyoto protocol. This protocol did not take into account that nation-states
can hardly be thought of as simple cost-minmizers, and that it may not have provided sufficient











etc.) decide on the consumption of a clean and a polluting (“dirty”) good,
where the latter produces negative externalities on the neighboring agents. In
this respect, our model is close to Harstad (2012), who studies the case of global
contamination, i.e., the situation in which the consumption of the dirty good
by each region affects equally all other regions. For this baseline scenario, his
focus is on the study of optimal contracts to reduce pollution in a dynamic
context. We depart from Harstad (2012) in that we allow the pollution of a
region (derived from its consumption of the dirty good) to affect differently
distinct regions. This feature is implemented by a (weighted) network that
specifies the bilateral exposures to pollution. Given the complexity introduced
by the network dimension, in order to keep the model tractable, we focus on a
static context.
In this static framework, we first study the incentives to pollute. These
incentives depend on the underlying network, consumption preferences and the
distribution of wealth (resources) across regions. Then, we study the effects
of transfer schemes (potentially implemented by a supranational authority) on
aggregate pollution. We find that, in the case of regions that are homogeneous in
terms of preferences and endowments, the equilibrium consumption of the dirty
good by each region is proportional to its (Bonacich) centrality in the network.3
Moreover, we observe that, even when regions are heterogeneous in wealth (but
still homogeneous in preferences), transfers from regions with high Bonacich
centrality to regions with low centrality reduce the aggregate consumption of
the polluting good. Similarly, for the case in which countries are heterogeneous
in terms of preferences and wealth, we obtain their equilibrium consumption as
a function of the network, the distribution of wealth and preference parameters.
This analysis allows us to calculate the effects of transfers from/to any country
on the (aggregate) consumption levels of the polluting good.
Finally, in an empirical application of our framework, we use a geographic
network and data on the GDP and the fossil fuel energy consumption in EU
member states to analyze the environmental impact of each member. Then,
under the lens of our model, we are able to identify the impact that the redis-
tributive (transfer) policies of the European Union have on the aggregate level
3 Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987) is a measure that accounts not only for the con-
nectivity or closeness of a node to other nodes, but also for the “importance” of these nodes
(see Section 3 and Jackson, 2008, for details). This measure has been widely employed in











of pollution. We find, in particular, that these policies entail a negative side
effect on the environment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review
the related literature. In Section 3, we present the model. Section 4 describes
our theoretical results. In Section 5, we study the application to the polluting
consumption in the European Union. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the large literature on environmental economics and to
the literature on social and economic networks. An exhaustive review of these
two strands is beyond the scope of this work and we focus here on a selection
of relevant papers.
Regarding the first strand, a large variety of models dealing with the in-
centives to abate pollution and to form international environmental agreements
has been considered in the literature (see the surveys in Wagner, 2001, and
Marrouch and Chaudhuri, 2015). In particular, Buchholz and Konrad (1994)
show that countries may strategically adopt costly abatement technologies to
credibly commit not to reduce environmentally harmful emission in the future,
and free ride on the other countries’ reductions instead. Relatedly, several pa-
pers focus on negotiations over emission reduction in either one or two periods.
For instance, Schmidt and Strausz (2015) study whether cooperation is sustain-
able without side payments, while Helm and Schmidt (2015) consider coalition
formation in the context of climate cooperation with endogenous R&D invest-
ments.4 Other recent papers consider a purely dynamic approach. In particular,
Harstad (2012, 2016) and Battaglini and Harstad (2016) study dynamic frame-
works in which countries both pollute and invest in substitute technologies over
time.5 They analyze emissions, investments and international environmental
agreements, while allowing for renegotiation, short term agreements and en-
dogenous coalition formation. In a complementary approach, Martimort and
4 Other related papers are Barret (2001) and Hong and Karp (2012), which study coali-
tion models with binary abatement choices; and Eichner and Pethig (2013) who intergrate
international trade in a standard coalition model.
5 See also Dutta and Radner (2009), which models the global warming process as a dynamic
commons game, and Calvo and Rubio (2013) for a survey of applications of dynamic games











Sand-Zantman (2016) use the methodology of mechanism design to investigate
how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, in-
centive compatibility, and participation when information is asymmetric.
On the other hand, one of the main theoretical contributions of this paper is
the application of a network approach to the environmental setup. Indeed, the
theoretical literature on social and economic networks has produced substan-
tial insights in many areas, once researchers have acknowledged that networks
play a prominent role in many aspects of society and economy (see Goyal, 2007;
Jackson, 2008; and the recent survey in Jackson et al., 2017). However, appli-
cations of this literature to environmental problems are still scarce. A recent
paper by Günther and Hellmann (2017) studies the stability of international
environmental agreements when pollution has both global and local effects in
a context of repeated games. They find that, whereas stable agreements do
exist when the underlying network structure is balanced, they may fail to exist
under large asymmetries.6 Additionally, Aller et al. (2015) analyze the impact
of the world trade network on the environment, and find that having a higher
(betweenness) centrality in the network is beneficial in environmental terms for
the developing but detrimental for the developed countries.
Although the network perspective has been barely used to study the local
impact of pollution, there have been significant advances in the literature on the
provision of public goods in networks (see, for instance, Bramoullé and Kranton,
2007; Allouch, 2015, 2017; Kinateder and Merlino, 2016; and Elliott and Golub,
2019).7 As contributions to a public good represent a (positive) externality on
neighbors, this literature is closely related to our work. In particular, we build on
the recent progress made by Allouch (2015), who analyzes the private provision
of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and
benefit only from their direct neighbors’ provisions. Our model departs from
his setup by considering a game where agents may harm their neighbors (by
polluting) and by allowing a weighted (rather than binary) network.
6 See also Bayer et al. (2019), which studies adaptive learning in the class of weighted
network games, with potential applications to the economics of pollution.
7 Galeotti et al. (2010) apply a network approach to the more general setting of games
of strategic subsitutes. Some of the network models have also been tested in the laboratory,
finding empirical support for the theoretical results. See, for instance, the experimental papers
by Weitzel and Rosenkranz (2012) that considers the model of Bramoulle and Kranton (2007),












We consider the set N = {1, ..., n} of agents, which we will usually refer to as
countries or regions. Each region i ∈ N consumes a combination of a “clean”
and a “dirty” (polluting) good, maximizing the utility function ui(ei, xi), where
ei ∈ [0,∞) and xi ∈ [0,∞) are, respectively, the amounts of the clean and the
polluting good consumed by region i. We normalize the price of the clean good
to one and denote by pi ∈ (0,∞) the price of the polluting good paid by i.
Each region is endowed with a budget ωi ∈ (0,∞) to spend on consumption.
However, the consumption of the polluting good creates (negative) externalities
that affect the wealth of the neighboring regions.
The externality that (the consumption of the polluting good by) region k
imposes on region i depends on i’s exposure to k’s emissions. Specifically, we
assume that regions are embedded in an exogenous weighted network g, with the
associated (weighted) adjacency matrix G ∈ Rn×n+ . This network can represent,
for example, geographic distances, where Gik ≥ 0 measures the exposure of
region i to region k. Regarding externalities, we assume that the consumption
xk of the polluting good by country k causes a reduction in the budget of
country i that is proportional to Gik. Specifically, the aggregate consumption




imposes the cost of δX−i(g) on i, which reduces i’s budget to ωi − δX−i(g).
The parameter δ ∈ [0,∞) captures the strength of the externalities caused by
the relevant pollutant. Alternatively, δ can be interpreted as a normalization
factor that adjusts the exposure units implicit in the matrix G.
Note that there are many different forms by which the pollution by a region
can affect negatively its neighbors by reducing their budgets to be spent on
consumption. The most immediate one is via the health of the inhabitants
of the affected regions. It is well documented that pollution has a negative
effect on health (see, e.g., Kampa and Castanas, 2008), and that many forms of
pollution spread geographically, more intensively to neighboring regions (Liang
et al., 2016). Thus, the pollution by a region imposes a cost on other regions in
terms of resources lost due to the “imported” contamination.
In this line, some recent studies aim to identify the negative economic impact











quality on hospital spending, while the OECD (2014) report estimates the health
impact of road transport. Even more recently, some studies quantify the negative
economic effects of air pollutants (e.g., the fine particulate matter, PM2.5),
which informs our assumption on the negative externality derived from the
pollution of neighboring regions. Indeed, the OECD (2016) publication on “The
Economic Consequences of Outdoor Air Pollution” assesses the effects of air
pollution on health by estimating concentration-response functions and linking
health impacts to population weighted mean concentrations of air pollutants.
This study quantifies also the negative impact of air pollution on agriculture by
estimating crop yield changes. In a similar vein, for the case of China, Xie et
al. (2019) estimate that in 2030, without control policies, PM2.5 pollution alone
could lead to the loss of 2.0% of GDP.
We note that the framework described above defines a simultaneous game
Γ = Γ(g, δ, {ui, ωi}i∈N) with continuous strategy spaces ei ∈ [0,∞) and xi ∈
[0,∞) for each player i ∈ N . For any given level X−i(g) of the polluting
consumption by i’s neighbors in this game, we obtain the reaction function for
player i from the solution to the optimization problem,
max
ei,xi
ui(ei, xi), s.t. ei + pi · xi ≤ |ωi − δX−i(g)|+, xi, ei ≥ 0, (1)
where |z|+ ≡ max{z, 0}. In particular, the utility maximizing consumption of
the polluting good obtains, under standard assumptions, from the optimization
problem (1) as the demand (Engel) function,
xi ≡ di(|ωi − δX−i(g)|+). (2)
4 Theoretical results
In what follows, we focus on situations where neighborhood externalities - as
captured by the parameter δ - are sufficiently small. Specifically, for a given
game Γ, we define δ ≡ δ(Γ) ∈ (0, 1) as the maximum value such that, for
all δ < δ an interior Nash equilibrium, i.e., a Nash equilibrium with interior
solutions to the optimization problem (1) for all i ∈ N , exists. Such a threshold
can be always found when both goods are normal and all players have strictly
positive endowments. Moreover, for the sake of empirical applicability, we shall

















with the parameter αi ∈ (0, 1), possibly different for each i ∈ N . Under this
utility function, the solution to the optimization problem (1) for country i can
be interpreted as resulting from the optimization problems solved by the inhab-
itants of this country, each of them facing the same price pi and possessing a
share of the wealth |ωi− δX−i(g)|+. The demand function (2) for the polluting




|ωi − δX−i(g)|+. (3)
Hence, αi/pi is consumer i’s demand of the dirty good per unit of her “net
income” |ωi − δX−i(g)|+. We collect the ratios αi/pi in the diagonal matrix
A, where Aii ≡ αi/pi and Aik ≡ 0 for i = k. It turns out that the square
matrix δAG and its eigenvalues λ1(δAG), ..., λn(δAG) play a crucial role in our
analysis, as spelt out in the following simple but important result.
Proposition 1 When the spectral radius of the matrix δAG is less than one,
ρ(δAG) ≡ max
i
|λi(δAG)| < 1, (4)
then the unique interior Nash equilibrium consumption vector exists and is com-
puted as
x
∗ = (I + δAG)−1Aω = (A−1 + δG)−1ω, (5)
where I is the identity matrix and ω = (ω1, ..., ωn).







∗ = A(ω − δGx∗) (6)
⇒ (I + δAG)x∗ = Aω.
It is well known (see, e.g., Molnár and Szidarovszky, 2002) that the inverse of
I + δAG exists if and only if the spectral radius of the matrix δAG is less than
one. Hence, the claim follows.
Clearly, one can always find a sufficiently small value of the parameter δ such
that the spectral radius of δAG is less than one. IfG is an adjacency matrix, then











spectral radius of the adjacency matrix corresponding to the complete network
with n nodes is n − 1. In this case, δ would need to scale with n in order to
satisfy the condition in Proposition 1. However, in our empirical application,
matrix G is column stochastic independently of the size and topology of the
underlying network. This implies that its spectral radius is always one.
In the following corollary of Proposition 1, we relate the Nash equilibrium
consumption by players to their Bonacich centralities in the network g in the
case of uniform ratios αi/pi and budgets ωi. This centrality measure, due to
Bonacich (1987), has been widely employed in the theoretical and empirical
literature. Ballester et al. (2006) were first to establish a connection between
equilibrium actions and Bonacich centrality in their network game with local
complementarities singling it out from the vast catalogue of network centrality
measures.
For the binary adjacency matrix G and a constant κ such that the spectral
radius of κG is less than one, Bonacich centrality is defined by,




where 1 is the all-ones vector. As the ijth entry of the matrix Gs denotes the
number of walks of length s emanating from i and terminating at j,8 it follows
that the ith coordinate bi(G,κ) is the sum of all walks in G emanating from i
and weighted by κ ∈ (0, 1) to the power of their length.
Unlike in Ballester et al. (2006) and related literature, in our setup G is not
necessarily a binary matrix (i.e., nodes may be connected by weighted links)
and the parameter κ is negative (see Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 below). The
consequence of the former fact is that weaker connections, i.e., connections via
links with smaller weights, have lower impact on Bonacich centrality. The latter
fact, on the other hand, implies that direct neighbors of an agent have a negative
impact on this agent’s centrality, while for neighbors’ neighbors this impact is
positive.
The next result uses the original definition given in Eq. (7) to characterize
the equilibrium outcomes in our game.
8 A walk of length s in a graph g emanating from node i and terminating at node j is
a succession of s (not necessarily different) edges of the form k0k1, k1k2, . . . , ks−1ks, where











Corollary 1 If a ≡ αi
pi
and ω = ωi are constant across agents and Eq. (4)
holds, then the interior Nash equilibrium consumption x∗ is proportional to the
Bonacich centralities b(.) in the graph g,
x
∗ = a · ω · b(G,−δa). (8)
Proof. By Proposition 1,
x








1 = a · ω · b(G,−δa),
where 1 = (1, ..., 1)′. The first equality in the second line follows from our
assumptions A = a · I and ω = (ω, ..., ω)′.
Although Corollary 1 contemplates a particular case of homogeneous wealths
and preferences, it neatly illustrates the impact of the exposure structure on
equilibrium consumption. It is instructive to combine Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) to
obtain an explicit formula for equilibrium consumption of the polluting good,
x




The last formula makes it clear that the direct neighbors (s = 1) of a player
have a negative impact on the Bonacich centrality and, hence, on the polluting
consumption by this player, while for neighbors’ neighbors (s = 2) this impact
is positive. Generally, the neighbors of i in the weighted network Gs decrease
(increase) i’s consumption of the polluting good for odd (even) s.
When agents have identical preferences but differ in wealth, we can re-
late Bonacich centralities to the aggregate consumption of the polluting good.
Specifically, assume that starting from an endowment vector ω (not necessarily
homogeneous), we add to each ωi a (possibly negative) transfer ti (the transfers
may or may not sum up to zero). We denote the vector of equilibrium consump-
tions before and after the transfer as x∗ and x∗t, respectively. Then, it follows
directly from Eq. (5) that,
x
∗t − x∗ = (I+δAG)−1A(ω + t)− (I+δAG)−1Aω = (I+δAG)−1At. (9)
For the case of homogenous demands (all players with identical ratios αi/pi),




















Proposition 2 If the ratio a ≡ αi
pi
is constant across agents and Eq. (4) holds,
then
X∗t −X∗ = a
n
k=1 tkbk(G,−δa).
Proof. Let F ≡ (I + δaG)−1 and F i ≡
n
k=1 Fki. By Eq. (5), we have
that X∗ = a
n
k=1 ωkF
k and X∗t = a
n
k=1(ωk + tk)F







This result shows that a transfer from a high Bonacich centrality node to
a low Bonacich centrality node will always reduce the aggregate consumption
of the polluting good, while a transfer between nodes with identical Bonacich
centralities has no effect on it. In the next example, we illustrate the effects of
a transfer between nodes with different centralities.
F 1. An example of equilibrium consumptions of the polluting good before (.)
and after [.] a transfer from node A to node B.
Example 1 Consider the network of four nodes depicted in Figure 1, where
N = {A,B,C,D}. For simplicity, assume that the network is binary, i.e., the
presence (absence) of an arrow pointing from node k ∈ N to node i ∈ N implies
Gik = 1 (Gik = 0). Let δ =
1
4
, and for all i ∈ N assume αi
pi
= a = 1
2
.
The numbers reported in the upper part of the nodes (within parentheses)
correspond to the equilibrium consumptions of the polluting good in the (homo-
geneous) case in which ωi = 1 for all i ∈ N . Corollary 1 implies, then, that the
Bonacich centrality bi(G,−δa) of the node i is twice its equilibrium consump-
tion. In Figure 1, we observe then that bA(G,−δa) = 0.92 for the peripheral
node A is higher than bB(G,−δa) = 0.68 for the central node B. This is due to












The numbers reported in the lower part of the nodes (within square brackets)
result after transferring half of the initial endowment of node A to node B (hence
corresponding to the equilibrium consumptions of the polluting good in the case
with ωA = 0.5, ωB = 1.5, and ωC = ωD = 1). Note that the consumption of
nodes C and D, which are not involved in the transfer, has also changed. The
total consumption of the polluting good is reduced by 4.3% by this transfer.
It is worth noting, however, that our static model does not account for po-
tential long run effects of transfers. Indeed, it is reasonable to consider that, if
transfers allow (less developed) countries to progress and invest in green tech-
nologies, they could have an additional long term impact on the environment.
Building on the results in this section, we investigate next an application
to the fossil fuel energy (FFE) consumption in the European Union. Clearly,
the (estimated) ratios αi/pi and wealths ωi will be different across the EU
countries. Thus, although it will be impossible to directly relate the polluting
consumption of a country to its Bonacich centrality, the characterization of the
Nash equilibrium consumption in Proposition 1 will enable us to study the side
effects of the redistributive transfer schemes implemented in the EU on the
aggregate levels of pollution.
5 Application - Fossil fuel energy consumption
in the European Union
In the following empirical exercise, we calibrate the model to EU data. First,
we compute the total impacts on the polluting consumption of all EU countries
except Malta and Cyprus (EU-26 in what follows) using data from the World
Bank on energy consumption, population and GDP for the EU-26 countries
reproduced in Table 1.9 ,10
9 Based on IEA data from the World Energy Balances c OECD/IEA 2016,
www.iea.org/statistics. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c; The data for the years 2007-2013 is avail-
able at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/.
10 We conducted the analysis for the year 2013, the last year for which we had a complete
set of data. The results for earlier years are very similar. Malta and Cyprus are excluded
from the analysis because they share no (land) borders with any of the other EU countries,












 1. Energy consumption, population and GDP in the EU-26 in 2013.
Columns 1 and 2 contain the names and (ISO 3166-1 alpha-3) codes of the countries,
Column 3: per capita energy use (kg of oil equivalent), Column 4: the percentage of
energy use that corresponds to FFE consumption. Column 5 and 6: population and
the GDP (in billions US$), respectively. Last column: the total FFE consumption
(in thousands of tons of oil equivalent).
From the data in Table 1, we compute the total FFE consumption as the
product of columns 3, 4 and 5 and report it in the last column of this table
(in thousands of tons of oil equivalent). We also observe (in the fourth column
of Table 1) that the share of the FFE is considerably above 50% of the total
energy consumption in all countries except for Estonia, Sweden, Finland and
France, with the Netherlands being the country with the highest percentage of
the FFE consumption. In absolute terms, the average FFE consumption in the
EU-26 is 45269.56 thousands of tons of oil equivalent, and the countries with











Italy and France (Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia).
We create the weighted exposure matrix G from publicly available data on
border lengths among countries as provided by the NationMaster database.11
Clearly, the length of the common border between countries yields a simplistic
measure of environmental exposures. Although more sophisticated measures
can be constructed,12 in this methodological paper we focus on easily available
data. The border lengths among each pair of countries in the EU-26 are reported
in Table A1 in the Appendix. For each i, k ∈ N , i = k, let dik = dki be the
length of the common border between countries i and k (in case i and k do
not share a border, dik = 0). We set dkk =

k =i dik, i.e., the total length of
country k’s borders with other countries in the EU-26. Then, for each i, k ∈ N ,
we define Gik =
dik
2dkk
. Implicit in this formulation is the idea that the pollution
by country k induces a cost (in terms of resource losses) both for country k and
for all its neighbors. The main cost of pollution - one half - is borne by the
polluting country (k), being the other half distributed among all neighbors of k
according to the (relative) lengths of their common border with country k.13
By construction, G is a column stochastic matrix. The corresponding (weighted
and directed) network is reproduced in Figure 2, where each node represents a
country,14 and the weight reported on the arrow (directed link) pointing from
country k to country i corresponds to the exposure Gik of country i to the
pollution by country k.15
11 See http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Geography.
12 For an estimate of the financial burden imposed on a country by air pollution “imported”
from another country see, for instance, Romley et al., 2010.
13 We also considered alternative specifications of the cost distribution, with the share of
the polluting country varying between 0 and 100%. We did not observe qualitative changes
to our main results. In particular, Figure A1 in the Appendix reports the total impact of
EU transfers on aggregate EU-26 FFE consumption for different values of the externality
parameter δ ∈ (0,δ) and the share parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) (hence, extending the results reported
in Figure 3 below for γ = 0.5). This impact turns out to be always positive, i.e., EU transfers
increase the aggregate FFE consumption for any δ and γ.
14 We use the country codes reported in Table 1 and three different sizes for nodes, according
to the extension of the country: the nodes with the biggest size correspond to countries with
more than 350,000 km2, the medium ones to countries with more than 200,000 km2 and less
than 350,000 km2, and the smallest ones to countries with less than 200,000 km2.











F 2. Geographic network G of the EU-26. Each node represents an EU-26
country and the weight reported on the arrow (directed link) pointing from country
k to country i corresponds to the exposure Gik of country i to the pollution by
country k.
Assuming equilibrium consumption x∗i of the FFE in country i and using the
GDP of this country as a proxy of its total consumption spending ωi−δX∗−i(g),





x∗i = Aii(ωi − δX
∗
−i(g)).
Note that we neither observe the initial endowments ω nor the externalities
δGx∗ separately. The computed Aii estimates the FFE consumption (in kg of
oil equivalent) per $1 of the GDP in country i and it is a direct indicator of
“dirtiness” of this country (see Table A2 in the Appendix, and the first two
columns of Table 2 below).
In order to estimate the cross-country impact of the FFE consumption, we
use Eq. (5) in Proposition 1,
x











We interpret Θik(δ) as the marginal increase in FFE consumption x
∗
i by country
i due to a small increase in wealth ωk of country k. Importantly, Θ(δ) captures
the direct and indirect effects of the latter increase on the equilibrium consump-
tion. In particular, when δ = 0 then Θ(0) = A and the only effect of the unit
increase in ωk is the change in FFE consumption xi by Aik, where Aik = 0 if
i = k and Akk is the autarkic change in polluting consumption in country k
when its GDP increases by $1.
Although we do not observe δ directly, we can estimate its maximum value





For our data, this estimation yields (approximately),
δ = 6.66.
In Table 2, we show the total impact Θk(δ) ≡

i∈N Θik(δ) of country k
on the FFE consumption of the EU-26 countries for δ = 0, δ = δ/2 and δ = δ
(the complete matrices Θ(0), Θ(δ/2) and Θ(δ) are reported in Tables A2-A4
in the Appendix).16 To illustrate the role of externalities, consider the case of
the Netherlands (k = NLD). As we observe in Table 2, without externalities
(δ = 0) their total impact is Θk(0) = Akk = 82.12, i.e., an additional dollar
increases the (aggregate) FFE consumption by 82.12g of oil equivalent. This
impact drops to 65.28g when δ = δ/2 and to 54.02g when δ = δ. This is mostly
due to negative externalities of the Dutch FFE consumption on its neighbors.
For δ = δ/2, in particular, the FFE consumption of these neighbors decreases
due to the externalities by, e.g., 4.15g for Germany and by 3.59g for Belgium
per $1 increase in the wealth ωk (see Table A3 in the Appendix). These reduc-
tions in the FFE consumption by neighbors become larger when δ = δ (in the
mentioned examples, 6.78g for Germany and 5.79g for Belgium - see Table A4
in the Appendix).
16 Note that some values Θik(δ) are positive for i = k. In these cases, the increase in GDP
in country k leads to higher FFE consumption in country i. This is a manifestation of a












 2: Total impact of $1 increase in the wealth of the EU-26 country k on the
aggregate FFE consumption of all EU-26 countries. This impact depends on the
value of the externality parameter δ and is reported for δ ∈ {0, 3.33, 6.66}. For each
reported δ, countries are sorted from the lowest to the highest total impact.
From the previous section, we know that income redistribution influences the
polluting consumption and can lead to the overall decrease in pollution. Below,
we modify Eq. (10) by adding taxes (subsidies) t to the initial wealth vector ω,
x
∗ = Θ(δ)(ω + t) = Θ(δ)ω +Θ(δ)t. (11)
In light of Eq. (11), redistribution schemes resulting in transfers from country
m (l) to country l (m) decrease (increase) the aggregate FFE consumption,




Θk(δ), l ≡ argmin
k
Θk(δ).
For example, Table 2 shows that, when δ = δ/2 = 3.33, a transfer of t = $1












of oil equivalent in the total FFE consumption by the EU-26 countries.
Given the total impact of each EU-26 country on the aggregate level of
pollution, our model can help assess environmental side effects of redistributive
policies in the European Union. Table 3 shows the net transfers (expenditures
net of contributions) for each member state obtained from the EU budget 2013
financial report.17
T	
 3. Expenditure and contributions of EU-26 member states in 2013 (million
EUR). Column 1 (Country): Country code. Column 2 (Exp.): Total EU expenditure
for the country. Column 3 (Cont.): National contribution to the EU budget,
including Traditional Own Resources collected on behalf of the EU. Column 4 (Net
Trans.): Net transfers = column 2 - column 3.












Note that the net transfers can be positive (for a net recipient) or negative
(for a net contributor). In Table 3, the rows corresponding to net recipient
countries with net transfers above the median are shaded in grey. From Eq. (9),
we can then derive the total impact ∆(δ, t) of net transfers t on the aggregate
EU-26 contamination by computing the difference between the post- and the
pre-transfer equilibrium consumptions of the polluting good,
x















When Θk > 0, the net recipient k (tk > 0) increases the aggregate FFE con-
sumption by Θk(δ) · tk, while the net contributor (tk < 0) decreases it by this
amount. Clearly, the total impact ∆(δ, t) depends on the unobservable “ex-
ternality parameter” δ. Figure 3 plots ∆(δ, t) for the net transfers t, given in
the last column in Table 3, and for δ ∈ [0,δ], i.e., for all values of δ that are
compatible with our model.
F 3. Total impact ∆(δ, t) as a function of δ ∈ [0,δ] for the net transfers t
given in Table 3.
We observe in Figure 3 that the total impact of transfers is positive, i.e.
the aggregate FFE consumption increases for all values δ ∈ [0,δ]. Hence, re-
distributive EU policies in 2013 appear to have had a negative environmental











particular, ∆(0, t) = 2.5 · 1012 and ∆(δ, t) = 0.89 · 1012. Then, according to our
model, EU transfers in 2013 increased the aggregate FFE consumption in the
range between 8.9 · 108 kg and 2.5 · 109 kg of oil equivalent. In Figure A1 in the
Appendix, we verify the robustness of this finding. This figure reports the to-
tal impact ∆(δ, γ, t) of EU transfers on aggregate EU-26 FFE consumption for
different values of the externality parameter δ and the cost sharing parameter
γ ∈ (0, 1). The latter parameter captures the share of the pollution cost borne
by the polluting country (Figure 3 is a special case of Figure A1 when γ = 1/2).
Figure A1 shows that the total impact ∆(δ, γ, t) is positive, i.e., EU transfers
increase the aggregate FFE consumption, for all values of δ and γ.
Finally, for the sake of illustration, it is instructive to use our analysis in
order to identify the sets of countries whose total impacts on the aggregate
FFE consumption in the EU are, respectively, the highest and the lowest ones.
In Table 2 we already got a first impression on this issue. However, since the
externality parameter is unobserved, in order to produce conservative estimates
of these sets, we rely on the following procedure: For each δτ = τ ·δ, where τ =
0, ǫ, 2ǫ, ..., 1 for a small ǫ, we construct the vector of total environmental impacts
v(δτ ) = (Θk(δτ ))k∈N for all EU-26 countries and compute the median of v(δτ ).
Then, we collect the countries corresponding to the elements of v(δτ ) below
(above) this median in the set NBelow(δτ ) (NAbove(δτ )). Finally, we compute





Thus, the set NBelow (NAbove) contains countries that generate, through their
own consumption and externalities, less (more) pollution per additional dollar
than the median country for all δτ ∈ [0,δ]. Therefore, according to our model,
redistributive policies that consist on transfers to countries in NAbove (NBelow)
from countries in NBelow (NAbove) would increase (reduce) the total EU-26
FFE consumption, independently of the actual value of δ. In particular, from
our data we obtain that the countries in the sets NAbove and NBelow are those












 4. Classification of countries as computed from the vectors v(δτ ) of total
environmental impacts for δτ∈ {0, ǫδ, 2ǫδ, ...,δ}, where ǫ = 0.01 and δ= 6.66.
Note that some countries, like e.g. Portugal and the Netherlands, remain
unclassified in Table 4 (i.e., they do not appear either in NAbove or in NBelow),
because their environmental impact is sometimes ab ve and sometimes below
the median for different values of δτ .
18 Despite this fact, we observe that most
of the countries whose net transfers received from the EU are above the median
(shaded in grey in Table 3) are indeed contained in the set NAbove (left panel
of Table 4).19
In any case, as pointed out in the previous section, it is important to note
that our static model does not capture some long run effects of transfers among
countries that might be of importance. For instance, additionally to the spread
of pollution, there may be other diffusion processes operating coetaneously
through the network. Recent examples, like the increase in the investment
of renewable energy by several EU countries (Spain and Portugal, among oth-
ers), show that the adoption of green technology can also spread to neighboring
countries.20 The development of fully dynamic models that account for these
positive externalities would be useful to complement the insights gained in this
empirical exercise.
18 Note that the inclusion in NAbove(δτ ) or NBelow(δτ ) may vary with the strength of
externalities as parametrized by δτ .
19 Some exceptions are, for example, Spain and Luxembourg, which belong to the set
NBelow.













In this paper, we study the local dimension of pollution, i.e., its direct effect
on neighboring agents (regions, countries...) and its (aggregate) impact derived
from the exposure network. In particular, we analyze the incentives of agents
to pollute as a function of the network, agents’ preferences and the distribution
of wealth. For the simplest case, in which all agents are homogeneous in terms
of preferences and wealth, we observe that their levels of polluting consumption
are positively related to their (Bonacich) centralities in the network. For the
(more general) case of heterogeneous agents, we characterize the equilibrium
pollution profile as a function of the network and the income distribution. We
have then applied our results to study the European fossil fuel energy consump-
tion and identify the environmental effects derived from the EU redistributive
policies. Our empirical application suggests that the EU transfer policies have a
negative (side) effect on the environment independently of the strength of local
externalities. Moreover, we identify the sets of countries with highest and lowest
total impacts, finding that the first group is mainly composed by the Central
and Eastern European countries, whereas the second one is essentially formed
by Western European ones.
We believe that this work is just a stepping stone in a much broader agenda
that aims at identifying and understanding the role of networks in environmental
economics. Most of the extant studies neglect the role of the network structure
in which the potential polluters are embedded. Our study shows that local
effects of pollution create different incentives than those derived from global
contamination. This observation might be of paramount importance for the
design of environmental policies. However, there are still many open questions.
For instance, our static model does not account for the potential long run ef-
fects of transfers. From the Kuznets Curve (EKC), which predicts an inverted
U-shaped relationship between environmental pollution and economic develop-
ment, we should expect that if transfers facilitate the economic development of
less developed countries, they would have a positive impact on the environment
in the long run (as these economies would reach a certain level of development).
We believe that a model that allows countries to invest the transfers in more effi-
cient technologies, hence facilitating sustainable development, would be of great











context in which regions pollute over time, negatively affecting their neighbors
and, at the same time, invest in green technologies spreading them through the
network. Another interesting extension would be to consider simultaneously the
two levels (global and local) at which pollution operates.
Regarding applications, the results derived from our and similar models
could be used to study the environmental effects of the redistributive policies
implemented in different regions across the world. Moreover, more sophisticated
alternatives to our measure of the exposure to neighbors’ pollution could be ex-
plored. Finally, we think that our results provide a framework to be tested in
the laboratory.21 In this respect, experimental studies could be fruitfully used
to complement the theoretical results and examine the effects of environmental
policies.
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 A1. Borders (in km) between EU-26 countries.22
22 Given the high proximity of Denmark and Sweden, and the fact that they are connected
by the Øresund bridge (operative since 2000), we consider a symbolic frontier (1 km) between
















































F A1. Total impact ∆(δ, γ, t) as a function of externality parameter
δ ∈ [0,δ] and the cost sharing parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) for the net transfers t given in













• We apply network approach to analyze individual and aggregate consump-
tion that generates local pollution
• Individual consumption that generates local pollution is related to network
centralities
• The theoretical model is calibrated to European data on fossil fuel energy
consumption
• The impact of EU redistributive transfer policies on the aggregate level of
pollution is discussed
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